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1 Introduction
Is democracy about the median voter or does money make a di↵erence? In their seminal
work, Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001) have highlighted the di↵erent mechanisms through
which special interest groups may a↵ect policy in modern democracies. Among others, interest
groups make campaign contributions to a↵ect the likelihood that a candidate is elected. With
rising inequality, there is today growing concern that money may increasingly corrupt politics.
Such a risk explains why, in the majority of the developed countries, there is legislation to
control and limit the amount both firms and individuals can give to either or both politicians
and political parties. In the United States, where most of these regulations have been removed
during the last decades1, the last elections smashed previous records for outside expenditures
(Kuhner, 2015), and mega donors fuel the rising costs of elections.2
In France, a number of important reforms providing public funds for campaigns and parties
and limiting campaign spending have been enacted since 1988 (Gunlicks, 1993). However,
campaign spending is still at the core of the debate, as the trial over the 2012 Nicolas Sarkozy’s
campaign overspend (“Bygmalion a↵air”) reminded us.3 Moreover, not only the amount
but the overall structure and composition of spending matter, in particular the sources of
campaign contributions (Vanberg, 2008). E.g., the 2017 campaign of today’s French president
Emmanuel Macron, absent the financial pot of a traditional political party, was largely funded
by donations, unlike other candidates.
How much does campaign spending influence the election? This empirical question has
important implications for the debates over the relevance of campaign finance reforms. Al-
though it has generated a very important literature both in economics and in political sciences,
previous studies have reached conflicting conclusions. As highlighted by Ansolabehere et al.
(2003), “the links from an individual campaign contribution to the election prospects of can-
didates (...) are not very firm.” While the traditional view that challenger spending is more
e↵ective than incumbent spending has been discussed at length, the jury is still out, with a
number of opposing views. On the one hand, some argue that challenger spending has much
greater marginal returns that incumbent spending (Abramowitz, 1988; Jacobson, 1978, 1980,
1985, 1990, 2006; Palda and Palda, 1998; Gerber, 2004). On the other hand, others claim
that the marginal e↵ects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal (Green and
1In the United States, since 1976, the Supreme Court has struck down a host of campaign finance reforms,
the most recent change being the Supreme Court’s 2014 opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC (see e.g. Kuhner,
2014; Post, 2014).
2In the 2014 elections, 31,976 donors – equal to roughly one percent of one percent of the total population
of the United States – accounted for $1.18 billion in disclosed political contributions at the federal level,
i.e. 29% of all fundraising that political committees disclosed to the Federal Election Commission in 2014
(OpenSecrets.org). During the 2016 Presidential election, 1% of donors give 67% of the money.
3While in the United States a candidate can go over the spending threshold specified by the campaign
finance law – and in this case is not eligible for public funding –, campaign overspending is forbidden by law
in France.
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Krasno, 1988; Gerber, 1998; Foucault and Franc¸ois, 2005). Finally, according to Levitt (1994),
money does not influence election outcomes, while Ferguson et al. (2016) find the relations
between money and major party votes are well approximated by straight lines.
In this article, we seek to address this consequential controversy by analyzing a new
comprehensive dataset of all the French municipal and legislative elections since the 1990’s.
France has enacted important reforms granting public funding for campaigns and parties
and regulating political financing since 1988. Our dataset covers four municipal and five
legislative elections, with a total of around 40, 000 candidates. The data is mostly paper data
that we digitize and merge from various historical sources. Producing these data is our first
contribution.
We start by documenting the evolution of campaign finance in France. Regarding the
legislative elections, we observe a strong decrease in spending after the 1993 election, from
around e22, 000 per candidate on average in 1993 to e10, 000 in 2007. This is due to changes
in regulation, with a decrease in the spending limit for legislative elections (but no change
for the municipal ones) as well as the prohibition of donations from legal entities introduced
by law in 1995 for all the elections. Despite this prohibition, spending for municipal elections
increased between 1995 and 2001 (by about e2, 000 per candidate), but have been decreasing
since then. On the contrary, we observe an increase in spending for legislative elections
between 2007 and 2012.4
Furthermore, we show that both the amount and sources of campaign contributions vary
widely from one candidate to another. In particular, private donations represent a much
higher share of funding for right-wing than for left-wing candidates in both municipal and
legislative elections. On average, right-wing candidates receive an extra e3, 400 in private
donations in municipal elections compared to left-wing candidates, while candidates from the
extreme left and the extreme right receive nearly no donations. This extra e3, 400 translate
directly in right-wing candidates getting e4, 200 more in total revenues, and spending e3, 000
more for their campaign. The di↵erence is even more striking for legislative elections where on
average candidates from the right-wing party receive e18, 000 in private donations, compared
to slightly less than e10, 000 for the Socialist party candidates, e2, 300 for the Communist
party candidates, and less than e500 for the other parties. Like for the municipal elections,
this is reflected in the candidates’ total spending.
We then investigate the e↵ect of an increase in campaign spending on electoral results.
France – like the vast majority of democracies around the globe5 – has a multiparty electoral
system, which raises a number of empirical challenges. In particular, the OLS regression
model traditionally used for the analysis of two-party system is inappropriate when three
4Unfortunately, spending data for the 2017 legislative elections are still not available.
5As highlighted by Tomz et al. (2002), “in the postwar period, the United States stands alone as the only
industrialized country with a consistent two-party system.”
2
or more parties compete in elections. To tackle these challenges, we rely on the multiparty
electoral data literature and the recent methods developed therein. Katz and King (1999)
have first proposed a comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty, district-level
elections such as the French elections. However, their statistical model is computationally
demanding, and hence slow and numerically imprecise with more than three parties (Honaker
et al., 2002). We thus follow the approximate methods produced by Honaker et al. (2002)
and Tomz et al. (2002). Their methods work with many parties without making too many
theoretical compromises.
Two fundamental features of multiparty voting data are that the vote share obtained by
each candidate falls within the unit interval, and that the sum of the vote shares in each district
is equal to one. Concretely, following Katz and King (1999), Honaker et al. (2002) and Tomz
et al. (2002), we calculate the natural log of each party’s share of the vote, relative to that of
a reference party (multivariate logistic transformation). We then use this transformed vote
share for each party as a dependent variable and regress each on a set of explanatory variables
– including election fixed e↵ects and district fixed e↵ects – via a seemingly unrelated system
of equations (SUR). To perform this analysis we use Clarify, a statistical suite incorporated
on Stata (King et al., 2000; Tomz et al., 2001).
An additional complication comes from the fact that all parties do not field candidates in
every election district. Hence, the SUR model may drive information loss; in particular, the
information from district elections that are not fully contested (i.e. where all the parties do
not run) is dropped by this model. Two alternative strategies have been proposed to tackle
this issue, and we use them in turn. First, we estimate the e↵ect of campaign spending on
votes only in fully contested districts. However, by doing so, we may lose useful information.
We then follow Honaker et al. (2002) and use their “full information approach”.6 To do so,
we input the observed voting data for all the parties using the Amelia imputation software
(Honaker et al., 2000), and study the “e↵ective vote”, that is the value of the vote shares
that we would observe if all parties were contesting in all districts. This approach treats
the problem of explaining the e↵ective vote in partially contested districts as a missing data
problem. The assumption here is that a party that chooses not to contest an election would
have received fewer votes than any of the parties that did run if it had contested the election.
We perform a number of counterfactual estimations and obtain a positive impact of spend-
ing on votes, both for municipal and legislative elections. This e↵ect is statistically and eco-
nomically significant: would candidates from the right-wing party have been banned from
spending during the last legislative election campaign, the party would have received 2.3 mil-
lion fewer votes at the national level in the first round of the election. According to our
6A third alternative approach consists of running a separate analysis for each pattern of contestation (Tomz
et al., 2002). However, such an approach does not work well for complex patterns of partial contestation such
as the one we observe in France.
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estimates, the price of a vote is of around 6 euros for legislative elections. Knowing that on
average the right-wing party candidates spent e8, 200 more than the socialist party candi-
dates, the extra private donations they receive give them a 1, 367 to 2, 734 vote advantage,
depending on whether their electoral gain happens at the expense of the socialist party, which
corresponds to 3 to 6% of the votes cast in the first round. In other words, relatively small
changes in spending patterns and caps make a very large di↵erence in electoral outcomes and
seats.
Regarding municipal elections, we find the price of a vote to be higher: according to our
estimates, the price of a vote for municipal elections is of around e32. Note that candidates
tend to spend more for municipal than for legislative elections. Assuming that candidates
from the right would have received the same amount in private donations as candidates
from the left during the last municipal elections (2014) (which would amount to a e4.6
million decrease in the total amount of private donations received by right-wing candidates
compared to what they received), everything else equal, this would have decreased the total
number of votes obtained by right-wing candidates at the national level by nearly 260, 000.
In other words, one needs e18 in private donations to buy a vote. Hence, the role of money
appears to be substantial in French municipal elections, though not as extreme as for legislative
elections. This could be due to the fact that voters have better sources of information about
the candidates running for more local elections.
Finally, determining the causal impact of spending on votes is complicated by the endoge-
nous nature of campaign spending. A number of papers in the literature have tried to tackle
this question, using di↵erent strategies to address the endogeneity issue.7 For example Levitt
(1994) uses repeat challengers in U.S. Congressional elections to deal with endogeneity, and
Gerber (1998) instruments spending with variables that a↵ect a candidate’s ability to raise
campaign funds, such as her wealth level.8 In the face of conflicting results in the existing
research, Jacobson (2006) focuses on changes in support for candidates over the course of a
campaign using survey data. Estimating the impact of political advertising on presidential
election outcomes in the U.S., Spenkuch and Toniatti (2016) exploit exogenous variation in the
number of impressions across county borders driven by Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) regulations.9
In this paper, exploiting a change in campaign finance legislation, we propose a new
7An important number of papers have also treated campaign spending as exogenous. See e.g. Palda and
Palda (1998) on the 1993 French legislative elections and Jacobson (1978, 1990) on the U.S..
8Related to this literature on the impact of spending on candidates’ vote share, there is a large literature
on the e↵ects of campaign spending on the electoral fate of citizen initiatives. This literature faces similar
identification issues. To solve the endogeneity problem, de Figueiredo et al. (2011), who analyze ballot propo-
sitions in California from 1976 to 2004, use how concentrated the costs and benefits of an initiative are as a
new instrument for spending.
9As an alternative empirical strategy, one could use field experiments to study campaign-spending e↵ects
(see e.g. Gerber, 2004, for a review of this literature).
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instrument for campaign spending. In 1995 France enacted a law which prohibited candidates
from receiving donations from legal entities. This law was applied for the first time in the
1997 legislative elections. We exploit the fact that this change in legislation only a↵ected
those candidates who previously relied on private donations from legal entities. According
to our estimates, an additional euro received from legal entities in 1993 is associated with a
e0.46 decrease in total revenues between 1993 and 1997.10 We focus on the candidates who
ran both in the 1993 and in the 1997 elections and instrument the change in spending between
1993 and 1997 by the 1993 amount of donations received from private entities. This allows
us to compute a predicted value for the 1997 spending. Reassuringly, the magnitude of the
e↵ect we obtain when estimating the impact of the predicted spending on the vote shares is
only slightly lower than the magnitude of the e↵ect of the actual spending, and is statistically
significant at the one-percent level. In other words, our results do not seem to be driven the
endogenous nature of campaign spending.
Why does campaign spending yield an electoral benefit? While many factors may be at
play, we provide some suggestive evidence of the existence of a mobilization e↵ect. More pre-
cisely, we show that campaign spending is positively associated with turnout at elections, and
that the e↵ect is both statistically and economically significant. For example, for legislative
elections, a one-standard deviation increase in total spending by registered voters increases
turnout by 5 percent of a standard deviation.
Our contribution to the existing literature is fourfold. First, there is a lack of empirical
information about the flow of money and its impact on politics outside the case of the United
States.11 Yet it is critical in this area to develop a broad comparative perspective in order to
better understand and analyze the forces at play. In this paper, we document the long-run
evolution of campaign resources and spending in France12 and show that, despite regulations
limiting campaign spending, money still plays an important role in French politics. In a
recent working paper, Franc¸ois et al. (2016) also investigate the e↵ects of campaign spending
on electoral outcomes in France, but they only focus on the 1993 and 1997 legislative elections
and do not instrument for spending. On the contrary, we consider four municipal and five
legislative elections, and propose a new instrumental variable in a multiparty electoral setting.
Considering both local and national elections is of particular importance given we obtain
10Such a drop may be explained by the fact that the 1997 French legislative elections were unexpected.
While a general election was not due constitutionally until 1998, on April 1997, the French President Jacques
Chirac announced the dissolution of the National Assembly and a general election was scheduled to take place
in May.
11An exception is Foucault and Franc¸ois (2005) who investigate the e↵ect of campaign spending on the 1997
French legislative elections. However, their focus is on a single election while we consider all the municipal
and legislative elections from 1993 to 2014, providing an overview of the evolution of campaign spending in
France resulting from changes in the legislation. Scarrow (2007) reviews the literature on the impact of money
in politics in democracies outside of the United States. A recent paper in this literature is Avis et al. (2017)
who investigate the e↵ects of campaign spending limits on political competition in Brazil.
12Ansolabehere et al. (2003) document the sources and amounts of campaign contributions in the U.S..
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heterogeneous e↵ects, and show in particular that the price of a vote is higher for municipal
elections, a new finding in the literature.
Our findings could have important implications for other countries which, just like France,
have limited campaign spending by law. This is the case in the United Kingdom, but also in
Belgium, Canada, Chile, France, Israel, New Zealand, as well as South Korea, among many
others (Gunlicks, 1993; Nassmacher, 2009; Speck, 2013; Avis et al., 2017). Second, as we
highlighted above, France has a multiparty electoral system, like the vast majority of the
democracies around the globe. Hence, the empirical approach we use in this paper could be
of use for the analysis of campaign finance in a number of other countries. In particular,
rather than simply comparing the marginal e↵ects of incumbent and challenger spending, we
take advantage of the richness of our data to investigate the extent to which some parties
su↵er relatively more from the competition of (and money spent by) others. Specifically, we
show for example that spending by the Communist party both reduces votes for the Socialist
party, and, to a lower extent, for the right-wing party, with no direct e↵ect on other political
organizations (e.g. the extreme right). Furthermore, we investigate the heterogeneous e↵ects
of spending depending on the sources of revenues (e.g. personal contributions vs. private
donations). Finally, we propose a new empirical strategy to overcome the empirical issues
linked to the endogeneity of spending.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides historical back-
ground on the evolution of campaign finance laws in France. Section 3 introduces the new
dataset we built for this study and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 details the em-
pirical strategy used in this paper. In Sections 5 and 6, we estimate the relationship between
campaign spending and vote shares, both in municipal and in legislative elections. Section
7 shows that our results are robust to instrumenting campaign spending. In Section 8, we
provide additional results and discusses our findings. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 Historical Background and Today’s Rules
2.1 Campaign Finance Reform in France
French legislation on campaign and party financing has changed quite dramatically since the
1980’s. Financing rules are now stable and mainly focus on the following aspects of political
finance: (i) public funding of campaigns (through the reimbursement of campaign costs), (ii)
public funding of political parties, (iii) regulation of the donations to candidates and political
parties, and (iv) campaign spending caps.
France has enacted important legislation granting public funding for campaigns and parties
and introducing spending caps since 1988.13 Although candidates were reimbursed as early
13This section partly draws on Gunlicks (1993) for the 1988-1993 period.
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as 1962 for certain campaign costs, this is much later than in other countries. The laws of
1988 opened the way for a complete redesigning of the legislation on political financing.14
Before that, parties were treated as simple associations (subjected to the law of 1 July 1901).
They were not allowed to accept donations (from either legal or natural persons) and did not
receive public subsidies. Political parties relied – at least o cially – solely on membership
dues, capped to 100 Francs (i.e. around e2515), and the party group of caucus assessment.
In this Section, we review the di↵erent reforms that have been enacted in France since 1988.
Those readers who choose to skip these historical details may go directly to Section 2.2.
1988-1990 The laws of 1988 regulated political financing. First, they introduced trans-
parency regarding political funds (Articles 1 to 7). Since then, members of the government as
well as some elective o cials have been required to declare their wealth and assets. Political
campaigns themselves were rethought with the prohibition of advertising on television and
radio and the limitation of advertising in newspapers and telephone calls (phone-banking),
prohibited in the three months preceding the elections.
These laws also introduced direct public funding of parties as well as additional indirect
public funding in the form of public reimbursement of candidates for election campaign costs.
Regarding direct party funding, the funding was granted in proportion to the number of
deputies in the national assembly (“Assemble´e Nationale”) and in the Senate (“Se´nat”). The
introduction of public party funding led to the requirement that the parties must present a
financial statement.
With the 1988 laws, candidates were also allowed to receive donations. These donations
were limited, however: a natural person (i.e. an individual) could donate a maximum of
30,000 Francs by year (e7, 300) and a legal person (i.e. a corporation) a maximum of 50, 000
Francs (e12, 000) to a candidate. Donations of more than 1, 000 Francs must be paid by
check. In addition, donations may only cover up to 20% of the total campaign expenditures.
Contributions to candidates carried tax privileges. The donations to a candidate may be
deducted from taxes up to 1.25 percent of the income of a natural person and to 2 pro mille
of the turnover of a company.
Finally, since 1988, political parties have been considered as regular corporate bodies, even
if they are not registered as associations. Parties may receive private donations, the amounts
of which are also limited. Donations may not exceed 50, 000 Francs per year from a natural
person and 500, 000 Francs (e121, 000) from a legal person. Any donation of more than 1, 000
Francs must be paid by check.
14Laws no. 88-286 and no. 88-227 of 11 March 1988.
15In the paper, for the sake of comparability, we convert all the monetary numbers in constant 2014 euros.
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1990-1995 The 1990 law16 introduced further financing of political parties and candidates.
First, Article 10 modified the allocation of public party funding and established the division
of the amount budgeted into two equal parts. The first part was allocated for the funding
of parties and political associations and was dependent upon the results of the 1992 national
assembly election. This part was set aside for the parties and political groups that ran
candidates in at least 75 constituencies. The distribution was carried out in relation to the
number of votes on the first ballot. The second part of the public subventions was allocated
to those parties and associations represented in parliament. These subventions were granted
in proportion to the number of deputies in parliament.
Second, the 1990 law was on the limits on election expenditures, and it clarified the funding
of political activities. Donations to political parties were tax deductible in the amount of 1.25
percent of the income of a natural person, and 2 pro mille of the sales of a legal entity.
Third, since the 1993 elections, legislative election candidates have been entitled to a flat
rate campaign cost refund. In 1993, the candidates who obtained more than 5% of the votes
in their constituency receive public support amounting to 50, 000 Francs (around e12, 000).
The remaining candidates received nothing. Campaign expenditures were limited, however.
In order to qualify for public funds, the candidates were required to keep within the following
prescribed limits of expenditures for the campaign: in the last three months prior to the
election, each candidate for a seat in the national assembly couldn’t spend more than 500, 000
Francs (e121, 000) in her electoral district (400, 000 Francs in the constituencies with less
than 80, 000 inhabitants). Finally, the legislation also required candidates to account for the
campaign costs incurred. Regarding municipal elections, the public refund could not exceed
50% of the spending limit for the 1995 elections.
The 1990 law also created the “Comission Nationale des Comptes de Campagne et des
Financements Politiques” (CNCCFP) that has been checking and approving the accounts
of political parties and candidates’ campaigns since then. If an account is declared invalid
by the Commission, candidates and political parties may face fees and legal sanctions and
even ineligibility. All the legislative election candidates have to provide a detailed account of
their spending and revenues to the CNCCFP within the six months following the election,
as well as only municipal election candidates running in cities larger than 9,000 inhabitants.
Candidates have to appoint a financial representative (“mandataire financier”) who is the
intermediary between the CNCCFP and the candidate. The representative is in charge of
collecting funding and managing the campaign account.
1995-2003 The law of 199517 marked an important change in party and election financing
in France with the prohibition of donations from legal entities (and in particular for corpo-
16Law no. 90-55 of 15 January 1990.
17Law no. 95-65 of 19 January 1995.
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rations). This means that since 1995 only “natural” persons (i.e. physical individuals) can
make political donations. The maximum amount of donations from natural persons remained
the same. This change reduced the revenues of those candidates who were relying a lot on
donations from legal entities (and we will exploit it in the empirical analysis).
The 1995 law also modified the public financing of election campaigns. Candidates ob-
taining more than 5% of the votes received as a flat rate reimbursement for campaign cost a
sum equal to 50% of the campaign expenditure limit for the legislative elections (much higher
than the previous 10% threshold). The payment of the flat rate for campaign costs was based
on the condition that the respective candidate actually incurred these expenses during the
campaign.
Finally, the 2003 law18 focused on public party funding. It modified the division of the
amount budgeted. The first part was allocated for the funding of those parties and political
groups that ran candidates that receive more than 1% of the votes in at least 50 constituencies.
2.2 Today’s Rules
Since 2003, candidates can finance their campaign from: donations (only from natural per-
sons); personal contributions; party contributions19 and contributions in kind. A natural
person may contribute up to e4, 600 to each campaign, and donate yearly a maximum of
e7, 500 to political parties or groups. Donations to both campaigns and parties are tax de-
ductible. As of 2017, the tax deduction was equal to 66% of the value of the donation, up to
20% of the taxable income, which means that an individual who gives e1, 000 to a candidate
(and whose income is high enough) can reduce her taxable income by e660.
As to the funding of campaigns, candidates who win more than 5% of the votes in the
first ballot are reimbursed for their personal contributions to campaign spending up to 47.5%
of the spending limit.20 The spending limit varies depending on the elections and the size of
the electoral districts.
2.2.1 Spending Limits
Municipal elections Spending limits for campaign expenditures have been introduced with
the 1990 law (the “de´penses de propagande”, meaning the expenditures related to the printing
of ballots, campaign letters to the voters and campaign posters are directly paid by the state
and are not included in this limit). They are summarized in Figure 1. For municipal elections,
18Law no. 2003-327 of 11 April 2003.
19In 2014, party contributions to electoral campaigns (“aides financie`res aux candidats”) have represented on
average 9.6% of total parties spending (9.37% for the Socialist party but 1.05% for the right-wing party UMP).
Public party funding is regulated by Law no. 2003-327 of 11 April 2003. e63 million have been allocated to
political parties in 2015.
20Candidates are not refunded if their accounts are not approved by the CNCCFP.
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the spending limit depends on the size of the city for cities larger than 9, 000 inhabitants. (For
cities below 9, 000 inhabitants, there is no spending limit and no requirement to provide an
account for campaign spending and revenues.21) The spending limit is higher for candidates
qualified for the second ballot of the election. E.g. for the 2008 municipal elections, the
maximum amount that can be spent per inhabitant for candidates not qualified to the second
round (respectively qualified) was e1, 22 up to the 15,000th inhabitant (respectively e1, 68),
e1, 07 from the 15,001st inhabitant to the 30,000th (respectively e1, 52) until the last bracket
of e0, 53 (respectively e0, 76) from the 250,001st inhabitant. Those coe cients have not been
modified since 1995, even with the transition to the euro.22 (They have simply been discounted
every three years to follow the evolution of the price index.)
Legislative elections For legislative elections, the spending limit does not di↵er depend-
ing on whether candidates qualified for the second round. Moreover, contrary to municipal
elections, rules have changed since the 1993 elections. From 1991 to 1995, candidates were
allowed to spend up to 500, 000 Francs (e121, 000) per election, and only 400, 000 Francs for
constituencies with less than 80, 000 inhabitants. Since 1995, there is a new spending limit
composed of a flat rate and an additional amount depending on the size of the constituency.
In 1995, candidates were allowed to spend up to 250, 000 Francs (e52, 403) per election plus
1 Franc (e0.15) per inhabitant of the constituency. Those amounts were set to e38, 000 and
e0, 15 per inhabitant with the euro changeover, and have been updated every three years
since then. Interestingly, the change from a flat function of the population size (below and
above the 80, 000 inhabitant threshold) to a linear relationship sharply decreased the spending
limit faced by candidates for legislative elections.
[Figure 1 about here.]
2.3 Electoral System
Municipal elections The French electoral system for municipal elections is a two-round
list system with proportional representation (“scrutin de liste a` deux tours avec repre´sentation
proportionnelle”). If a list obtains the absolute majority in the first round, then half of the
seats are attributed to this list, and the other seats are shared between all the other lists
following the proportional representation with highest averages method. If no list obtains the
absolute majority in the first round, then there is a second round where only the lists which
obtained more than 10% of the recorded votes can take part. Half of the seats are attributed
21We thus don’t have spending data for these smaller cities and they are not included in our analysis.
22Before 1995, there was only one coe cient. In other words, the spending limit was the same for all the
candidates, whether or not they qualified for the second ballot.
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to the list which obtains most votes and the other seats are shared between all the other lists
following proportional representation.
Legislative elections The French electoral system for legislative elections is a two-round
system. The 577 constituencies are single-member constituencies. In this article, we focus
on the 555 constituencies that are in metropolitan France, excluding the French overseas
territories. If a candidate obtains the absolute majority in the first round, as well as a
minimum of 25% of all the registered voters, then she is elected. If no candidate obtains the
absolute majority in the first round, then there is a second round where the two most-voted
candidates and the candidates who obtained more than 12.5% of the registered voters can
take part. The candidate who obtains the majority of the votes then win.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We create a new, exhaustive dataset on campaign financing, expenditures and electoral results
at the candidate level, for all the municipal elections since 1995 and the legislative elections
since 1993. Producing this data is our first contribution. We do it by computing and merging
information from several sources, in particular data on electoral results from the Interior
Ministry and campaign spending and revenues data collected from the CNCCFP’s paper
reports (described in more detail below). Our dataset also includes information on electoral
districts’ socioeconomic and demographic information from the census. In the online Appendix
Sections B.2 and B.3, we describe in details the di↵erent steps we followed to merge the
information together, and in particular identify the candidates between sources and from one
election to another. In this section, we present each dataset in turns and provide descriptive
statistics.
3.1 Data on Electoral Results
The electoral data comes from the Centre de Donne´es Socio-Politiques (CDSP), the Interior
ministry, Bach (2011) and Cage´ (2017).23 We have data for the four municipal elections
which have taken place in France since the first campaign finance laws, in 1995, 2001, 2008
and 2014. Our electoral data are exhaustive with respect to the municipalities for which
we have campaign expenditures information. Similarly, we have information for all the five
legislative elections since 1993.
Our data contains information for 12, 325 di↵erent candidates for municipal elections,
and 28, 540 for legislative elections. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the number of
23We had to combine data from all these di↵erent sources because, except for the most recent years, the
CDSP and the Interior ministry data do not provide the names of the candidates. Yet we need this information
to identify candidates running multiples times.
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candidates running in the first round of each election. On average, around four candidates run
in the first round of municipal elections. The number of candidates is much higher on average
for legislative elections and it is increasing over time (from 9.6 on average in 1993 to 12 in
2012). As explained by Franc¸ois and Phe´lippeau (2015), changes in the legislation regarding
public funding to political parties has led to a sharp increase in the number of candidates
running for legislative elections. Indeed, the subsidy granted to a political party now depends
on the number of candidates fielded by the party in the previous general election. The amount
of the subsidy also depends on the vote shares obtained by the candidates in the first ballot
(funding is granted to parties that run candidates that receive more than 1% of the votes in
at least 50 constituencies).
[Table 1 about here.]
Political parties For each of the candidates running, we obtain information on his or her
political party for legislative elections, and either on their political party or political coalition
for municipal elections (more on this below). This information comes from the newspaper Le
Monde.24 In the online Appendix Section A, we detail for each election the list of the parties
running and the coalitions at play.
In the empirical analysis, for the legislative elections, we focus on the five political parties
that have consistently presented candidates in the majority of the districts during our period
of interest, namely (from the extreme left to the extreme right): (i) the “Parti Communiste”
(PC) (or Communist party); (ii) the Green party (whose name as changed a number of time
during the period); (iii) the “Parti Socialiste” (PS) (Socialist party); (iv) the right-wing party
(as detailed in the online Appendix, the name of this party has also changed a number of
times during our period of interest25); and (v) the “Front National” (FN) (National Front, the
French extreme-right party). In the empirical analysis, candidates from other smaller political
parties (or without political a liation) enter in the “other” category. This “other” category
is needed in order to perform the SUR analysis.26 Online Appendix Table A.1 provides
information on the number of districts in which each political party presented candidates for
all the elections.
Regarding municipal elections, while the information regarding the specific political party
to which a candidate is a liated is sometimes available, most often candidates categorize
themselves as “diverse left” (respectively “diverse right”) or “union of left” (“union of right”).
24In the electoral data made public by the Interior Ministry, information on candidates’ political parties are
often missing, imprecise or incomplete. On the contrary, journalists at Le Monde had, since the 1980’s, made a
very detailed work at classifying each candidate depending on its party. We thank the newspaper for agreeing
to share this information with us.
25Given the electoral coalitions at play from 1993 to 2012, candidates from the center-right party are part
of the right-wing party in our analysis.
26We indeed calculate natural log of each party’s share of the vote relative to that of this other party.
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This is illustrated in the online Appendix Table A.3. Hence in the empirical analysis, for the
sake of consistency, we focus on four categories: the extreme left, the left, the right, and the
extreme right.
3.2 Data on Election Campaign Costs and Expenditures
We collect very detailed data on election campaign costs and expenditures. The data are
paper data that we digitize and merge from the o cial reports on election campaign costs and
expenditures (“Publication simplifie´e des comptes de campagne”) published by the CNCCFP.
Online Appendix Figure B.1 provides an example of this data.
We focus on two types of elections: the local (municipal city-level) elections and the
legislative (general) elections. For local elections, we have data for all the elections since
1995 (1995, 2001, 2008 and 2014). For legislative elections, we have data for all the elections
since 1993 (1993, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012). This data is at the electoral district level; for
municipal elections our data covers all the electoral districts with more than 9,000 inhabitants,
since the campaign financing rules are only enforced for these municipalities.
Total spending Table 2 presents summary statistics on total spending. The upper table
presents the numbers for municipal elections, the bottom table for legislative elections. (Online
Appendix Figures D.1 and D.2 plot the distribution of the spending per registered voters,
respectively for municipal and legislative elections.) All the number are in constant 2014
euros.
Regarding municipal elections, the average spending per candidate is equal to e22, 802.
Normalized by the number of registered voters, candidates spend on average e1.16 per voter.
Candidates tend to spend less on average for legislative elections: e14, 712, which amount
to e0.21 per registered voter. Despite the fact that there are more candidates running for
legislative than for municipal elections, the average total spending per voter (summed over
all the candidates) is lower for legislative elections (e2.31 vs. e4.85).
[Table 2 about here.]
Regarding legislative elections, we observe a strong decrease in spending after the 1993
election. (Online Appendix Figure D.3 illustrates the evolution of campaign spending for
both municipal and legislative elections.) This is due to the change in regulation we describe
in Section 2, with a strong decrease in the spending limit for the legislative elections (but no
change for the municipal ones).27 The drop in the number of observations in 2012 is due to
a change in the reporting requirement rules: since the 2012 election, candidates who obtain
27Moreover, not only do we observe a decrease in the average spending by candidate but also a decrease in
the total amount spent (summed over all the candidates). Hence, while in 1993 more than 110 million euros
have been spent in the legislative elections by candidates, this number is equal to 90 million in 1997.
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less than 1% of the cast votes do not have to report their spending. Note however that the
increase in average spending between the 2007 and the 2012 legislative elections is not due to
this drop in the number of candidates reporting, as illustrated in the online Appendix Figure
D.5 where, for the sake of comparison, we plot from 1993 to 2012 the campaign resources of
only those candidates who obtained more than 1% of the cast votes. While those candidates
tend to have higher revenues on average, the trends are similar (a drop from 1993 to 2007
and then an increase).
Because di↵erent candidates are willing to spend di↵erent amounts – and can, inasmuch
as they respect the spending limit – the focus of this article is on the impact of di↵erences in
spending on the probability of being elected. Figure 2 shows the raw relationship between the
proportions of total spending and total (first round) votes received by candidate by district.
In the upper Figure 2a, we plot this relationship for the legislative elections, and in the bottom
Figure 2b for the municipal elections. The correlation is positive for the nine elections under
consideration and the relationship seems to be well approximated by a straight line. This
finding is consistent with the results of Ferguson et al. (2016) who consider U.S. data.
[Figure 2 about here.]
One can also notice from Figure 2 that the slope of the relation between spending share
and vote share appears to be significantly higher for legislative elections than for municipal
elections (a result to which we will return below). Obviously, correlation does not imply
causality and the goal of the article is to determine the extent to which this relationship is
causal.
Sources of funding So far, our focus has been on candidates’ spending. Let us now look at
their revenues.28 Note that while most often total revenues are equal to total spending, this
is not always the case. The di↵erence between revenues and spending is called the balance
of the campaign account (“solde du compte de campagne”). By law, it is forbidden to have
a negative balance: in this case, accounts are not approved and financial and legal sanctions
apply. However, candidates can decide to have a positive balance, i.e. to spend less than their
revenues. In the case of a positive balance, the remaining amount has to be given to a state
approved association or to a political party. E.g. Alain Juppe´, then candidate for the June
1995 municipal elections in Bordeaux (and Prime Minister since May 1995), had a positive
balance equal to e117, 000 (it spent e168, 000 but received e222, 000 in private donations, of
which e172, 000 donations from seven legal entities).
28There is large literature on the determinants of campaign contributions (see e.g. Chamon and Kaplan,
2013; Cotton, 2009, 2012; Petrova et al., 2017). In this paper, we take contributions as given, but investigate
the extent to which electoral results vary depending on the nature of the contributions.
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Our dataset provides revenue data by source: (i) private donations (since 1995, only
individuals are allowed to finance campaigns; legal entities are not allowed to donate) ; (ii)
party contributions; (iii) contribution in kind; (iv) personal contribution; and (v) others. Table
3 provides summary statistics on the relative importance of these di↵erent sources of funding.
(Numbers are average for all the years included in our dataset; in the online Appendix Figure
D.6, we plot the evolution of the relative importance of the di↵erent sources of funding.)
Municipal election candidates’ revenues come mainly from private donations (16%)29 and
personal contributions (74%). Parties contribute much more for legislative than for municipal
elections. While party contributions represent on average around 28% of the revenues of
legislative election candidates, personal contributions nonetheless represent the highest share
of total revenues in every instance (74% for municipal and 51% for legislative elections).
[Table 3 about here.]
How does funding vary depending on the political party for which the candidate is running?
Tables 4 and 5 present summary statistics, respectively for candidates running for legislative
and municipal elections. With respect to legislative elections, we concentrate on the di↵erences
between the five main political parties that are our focus in the empirical analysis, namely the
Communist party, the Green party, the Socialist party, the right-wing party, and the extreme-
right party. It appears that private donations represent a much higher share of funding for
the right-wing party candidates (27.2%) than for the candidates of all the other parties.
Moreover, the di↵erence is statistically significant at the 1% level between the Socialist party
and the right-wing party, even though private donations are relatively more important for
the Socialist party (17.8%) than for the Communist (12.3%), Green (5.6%) and extreme-right
(1.2%) parties. On average, compared to Socialist party candidates, the right-wing party
candidates receive an extra e8, 200 in private donations in legislative elections. This is of
particular importance given that, as we will see in the empirical analysis part of the paper,
the e↵ect of spending on electoral results is partly driven by private donations.
With respect to municipal elections, consistent with the strategy we follow in our empirical
analysis, we categorize the candidates into four categories: the extreme left, the left, the
right, and the extreme right. Similar to what we observe for the legislative elections, right-
wing candidates rely much more on private donations (which represent 21% of their total
revenues) than candidates from other parties. Moreover, the extra e3, 400 in private donations
received by right-wing candidates compared to left-wing candidates are not compensated by
lower party and/or personal contributions. They translate directly in right-wing candidates
29Unfortunately, we only have data on the total amount of private donations received, not on the number
of donors and their individual contributions. Vanberg (2008) develops a model in which the composition of a
candidate’s campaign budget matters. Using data from the US Congress, Dharmapala and Palda (2002) find
a negative relationship between the concentration of contributions and vote share.
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getting e4, 200 more in total revenues, and spending e3, 000 more. (Again, the di↵erences
are statistically significant at the 1% level.)
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
3.3 Controls
Finally, we collect municipal-level demographic data for municipal elections. Demographic
and unemployment data from the French census is available in electronic format (on the
website of the French National Institute of Statistics). The census took place in 1990, 1999,
2008, and 2013. We compute the share of the population by age group, occupation and degree.
For each measure, we interpolate both the numerator and denominator between census years
using a natural cubic spline (Herriot and Reinsch, 1973) and divide the two to obtain an
estimate of the relevant share.
Regarding legislative elections, unfortunately the controls are not available at the electoral-
district level, and they cannot be computed directly from the municipal-level information given
a number of municipalities are split between di↵erent legislative districts. The demographic
controls are thus computed at the department-level, using the same census information. Con-
sequently, electoral districts located within the same department (county) will have the same
values for those controls.
4 Empirical Strategy
There are two main empirical challenges we have to deal with: first, the multiparty nature
of the French electoral system, and second, the endogeneity of spending. In this section, we
begin by describing the characteristics of multiparty data. We present our IV strategy in
Section 7.
Katz and King (1999) have been the first to propose a statistical model for analyzing
multiparty data. We closely follow their seminal analysis here. Let vote sharecmt denotes the
proportion of the vote in district m (m = 1, ...,M) and election t for candidate c (c = 1, ..., C).
Two fundamental features of multiparty voting data are that each proportion falls within the
unit interval
vote sharecmt 2 [0, 1] for all m and c (1)
and the set of vote proportions for all the parties in a district sum to one:
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CX
c=1
vote sharecmt = 1 for all m. (2)
A good statistical model of multiparty voting data should satisfy the constraints in equa-
tions 1 and 2. Katz and King (1999) propose such a model; unfortunately, it is slow and
numerically imprecise with more than three parties, which is the case of France. We thus
follow here the practical alternative to Katz and King (1999) that has been provided by Tomz
et al. (2002). Concretely, we use SUR, a multiequation version of OLS. Following Katz and
King (1999) and Tomz et al. (2002), we convert the votes to an unbounded scale by applying
the multivariate logistic transformation. Specifically, we calculate the natural log of each
party’s share of the vote, relative to that of a reference party.
Our presentation here closely follows the one in Tomz et al. (2002). We denote each
party by j (j = 1, ..., J) and the vector of J   1 log ratios for electoral district m as
Ym =
⇥
ln (Vm1/VmJ) , ln (Vm2/VmJ) , ..., ln
 
Vm(J 1)/VmJ
 ⇤
and assume it is multivariate Nor-
mal with mean vector µm and variance matrix ⌃. We then model µm as a linear function of ex-
planatory variables (x) and e↵ect coe cients ( ), such that µm =
⇥
xm1 1, xm2 2, ..., xm(J 1) (J 1)
⇤
.
To estimate   and ⌃, we use Tomz et al. (2002)’s variant of SUR that employs the Feasible
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) algorithm.
Hence our empirical specification for the legislative elections is the following:
vote share Communist mt = ↵1 +
5X
j=1
 1j spendingjmt +
5X
j=1
 1j Incumbentjmt +X
0
mt1 +  1m + ⌘1t
vote share Green mt = ↵2 +
5X
j=1
 2j spendingjmt +
5X
j=1
 2j Incumbentjmt +X
0
mt2 +  2m + ⌘2t
vote share Socialist mt = ↵3 +
5X
j=1
 3j spendingjmt +
5X
j=1
 3j Incumbentjmt +X
0
mt3 +  3m + ⌘3t
vote share Right mt = ↵4 +
5X
j=1
 4j spendingjmt +
5X
j=1
 4j Incumbentjmt +X
0
mt4 +  4m + ⌘4t
vote share Extreme right mt = ↵5 +
5X
j=1
 5j spendingjmt +
5X
j=1
 5j Incumbentjmt +X
0
mt5 +  5m + ⌘5t
(3)
where t indexes the election (1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012), m the district & j the political
parties (Communist party, Green party, Socialist party, Right-wing party, and Extreme-right
party). For each party j, vote sharejmt is the log ratio of the party’s share of the vote in
district m and election t relative to that of the “other party”. The share of the vote of this
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“other party” is the sum of the share of the votes of the candidates running for smaller parties
(not included in the analysis) or with no political a liation.30 We estimate the equations
simultaneously via seemingly unrelated regression.
Regarding the independent variables, Incumbentjmt is an indicator variable equal to one
if the incumbent is from the political party j. The vector Xmt contains municipality-level
controls.  m and ⌘t denote fixed e↵ects for electoral districts and elections, respectively.
Our main explanatory variable of interest is spending. spendingjmt is equal to the political
party j’s spending per registered voter in district m and election t. (To take into account
the fact that the marginal returns from spending may be decreasing (Green and Krasno,
1988; Gerber, 1998; de Figueiredo et al., 2011), we also add square spending variables to the
regressions.) For example the coe cient  11 tells us how a 1-euro increase in spending per
voter by the Communist party a↵ects the log ratio for the Communist party. We use the
Clarify suite on Stata to perform the analysis and to interpret these coe cients in terms of
votes. In particular, we draw 1, 000 simulations of the parameters to infer counterfactuals
that we describe in the next Section.
Finally, note that the empirical specification for municipal elections is similar, to the
exception of the choice and classification of the political coalitions at play (extreme left, left,
right, and extreme right). Moreover, elections took place in 1995, 2001, 2008, and 2014 for
municipal elections.
Dealing with “missing data” Political parties do not run everywhere. When one or
more parties do not run in a district, this district is considered to be “partially contested” (as
opposed to “fully contested districts”). How can one deal with partially contested districts?
A first solution consists of excluding these districts from the analysis. This is what we do in
Section 5 where we estimate the e↵ect of spending on votes only in fully contested districts.
However, this approach is not entirely satisfying. First, by dropping a number of electoral
districts, we lose potentially useful information. Second, this might result in a nonrepresen-
tative sample (King et al., 2001; Tomz et al., 2002). As an alternative, Tomz et al. (2002)
suggest running a separate analysis for each pattern of contestation, i.e. to conduct two anal-
yses, one on the subset of fully contested districts, and another one on the subset of partially
contested districts. Yet, this approach does not work well for complex patterns of partial
contestation, such as the one we observe in France.
Given that we have highly variegated patterns of contestation, we prefer to follow Katz
and King (1999) and Honaker et al. (2002) who address the problem of partial contestation
by estimating the e↵ective rather than the actual vote. The e↵ective vote is the values of
30Hence the “other party” won’t be the same for example for the legislative and for the municipal elections.
In each specification, when presenting the results, we provide descriptive statistics on the relative importance
of this “party”.
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vote sharejmt that we would observe if all the parties contested the election in district m. In
districts with all parties contesting, the e↵ective vote is equal to the observed vote. In partly
contested districts, the e↵ective vote for all parties is unobserved but it can be estimated.
Such an estimation can be performed under a number of reasonable assumptions. We follow
Honaker et al. (2002) here and assume that the non-contesting party would have received fewer
votes than the parties that did nominate candidates. We then proceed in two steps. First, we
use the Amelia imputation software to impute the observed voting data for all the parties.
We perform 5 imputations. The outcome from Amelia is thus five imputed data sets, with
appropriate weights to perform the SUR analysis on Clarify. Clarify indeed appropriately
combines the results, and computes our quantities of interest automatically using the SUR
methodology described above. We present the results of this “full information approach” in
Section 6.
5 Results: Fully Contested Districts
5.1 Legislative Elections
5.1.1 Log Ratios
Table 6 presents the results for legislative elections for the fully contested districts. An
observation is a district x election. If we first focus on our five main independent variables of
interest (spending by the Communist party, the Green party, the Socialist party, the right-
wing party and the extreme right party), the  ’s tell how a 1-unit change in spending by these
di↵erent political parties would alter the log ratio for a particular political party. Hence, we
find that a one-euro increase in spending by the Communist party increases the log ratio of
the Communist party share of the vote – relative to the “other” party – by 1.15, and that
this result is statistically significant at the 1% level. (Online Appendix Table C.3 presents
summary statistics on the other party’s vote share. During our period of interest and in the
fully contested districts under consideration here, it obtained on average 15.8% of the votes
cast in the first round.) More generally, if we look at the diagonal numbers, we see that all
the parties benefit from increasing their spending (increase in the log ratio by 1.15 for the
Communist party, 2.91 for the Green party, 0.60 for the Socialist party, 2.09 for the right-
wing party, and 0.55 for the extreme-right party), and that the e↵ects are always statistically
significant at the 1% level.
[Table 6 about here.]
Moreover, spending by di↵erent parties may also directly a↵ect the vote shares obtained
by other parties. Hence, not only does spending by the Communist party lead to an increase
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in vote shares for this party (relative to the “other” party), but it is also of interest to note
that it has a statistically significant negative e↵ect on the Socialist party (with no e↵ect on
the Green, right-wing, or extreme-right parties). Similarly, the Socialist party also negatively
su↵ers from spending by the Green party, and spending by the Socialist party negatively
a↵ects the vote shares of the Communist and of the Green party.
5.1.2 Counterfactual Estimate
By construction, given that we use time-varying party fixed e↵ects in equation (3) (⌘1t,...,
⌘5t), our model is able to replicate the evolution of national vote shares. This is illustrated in
the online Appendix Figure D.7 where we plot the actual vote shares obtained at the national
level by the five main parties in the first round of the elections together with the expected
value of the vote shares predicted by the SUR model.31 The interesting question is to see how
these vote shares vary if spending changes.
We perform a first counterfactual estimation. We assume that the right-wing party was
not allowed to spend money (spending by the right-wing party is set to zero in all the dis-
tricts/years), everything else being equal. To what extent would it have a↵ected the results?
To answer this question, we compute the total number of votes obtained by each party under
this assumption. We aggregate these votes at the national level. (But the counterfactual is
estimated at the electoral district / election level: hence, for each districts / election, we have
the expected value of the vote shares obtained by the di↵erent political parties.)
To get a sense of the magnitude of the treatment imposed here, note that on average,
during our period of interest, right-wing candidates spent e0.64 per registered voters. In
1993, they spent more than e1 (online Appendix Table C.1 presents the average spending per
eligible voters by political parties for the 5 legislative elections). Hence, over all the right-wing
party candidates, no spending in 1993 would have implied at the national level a decrease by
more than e20.7 million in the amount spent.
Figure 3 plots the vote shares obtained by the di↵erent political parties in the model
when the right-party candidates are not allowed to spend. It appears clearly that a ban on
the right-wing party spending would have decreased the votes received by this party in all the
five elections. The Socialist party would have mostly benefited from it.
[Figure 3 about here.]
In Table 7, we compute the associated by price of a vote. We find that this price varies
between e4.8 and e6.6. For example for the 1993 legislative elections, assuming that the
right-wing party candidates were not allowed to spend (upper Table 7), this would have led
31What is more striking is that we are also able to replicate the between-district variations in party vote
shares, as illustrated in the online Appendix Figure D.8 with the example of the socialist party.
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to a decrease by 3.7 million in their number of votes at the national level. Given that the
implied change in spending would have been of around e20.7 million, it implies that the price
of a vote is equal to e5.5.
[Table 7 about here.]
5.2 Municipal Elections
Table 8 presents the results for municipal elections. In the case of these elections, the extreme
left and extreme right parties have only presented candidates in a few districts. For example,
for the 2008 municipal elections, the extreme right is present in only 138 districts (out of
1, 002) (see e.g. online Appendix Table A.4). Hence, we consider here only the left and
right, and include the candidates from all the other parties (or with no party) in the “other”
category.
The results we obtain for municipal elections are consistent with our findings for the
legislative ones: spending by the left increases the log ratios of the vote shares of the left
(with respect to the “other” party) while spending by the right has a positive e↵ect on right-
wing candidates’ vote shares. The magnitude of the e↵ect is about the same for the left and
the right. We find that a one-euro increase in spending per voter by the left party increases the
log ratio of the left party share of the vote relative to the “other” party by 0.32.32 Moreover,
there is no direct statistically significant e↵ect on spending by the left on the right vote
shares. Adding square spending variables to the regressions, we also show that spending has
diminishing returns.33
[Table 8 about here.]
How substantial is the role of money in French municipal elections? To answer this ques-
tion, we perform a number of counterfactual estimations. First, we assume that the right-wing
party was not allowed to spend money (spending by the right-wing party is set to zero in all
the districts/years), everything else being equal. Second, we perform the opposite thought
experiment, and assume that all the right-wing party candidates spent e4 per eligible voters.
Figure 4 plots the vote shares obtained by the left, the right, and the other candidates at the
national level depending on the di↵erent scenarios.
32Online Appendix Table C.4 presents summary statistics on the other party’s vote share. During our period
of interest and in the fully contested districts under consideration here, it obtained on average 9.1% of the
votes cast in the first round.
33With respect to the legislative elections, we estimate how well our model is doing by comparing the actual
votes obtained by each political coalition with the estimated distribution of the votes we obtain conditional
on the true values of the explanatory variables. In the online Appendix Figure D.9, we plot the actual vote
shares obtained by the left-wing coalition, the right-wing coalition, and the remaining candidates in the first
ballot together with the expected value of the shares predicted by the SUR model. Our model does very well
at predicting the vote shares in all the four elections.
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[Figure 4 about here.]
Not surprisingly given the estimates of Table 8, we find that the right-wing party would
have su↵ered from a ban, while allowing all its candidates to spend e4 per voter would have
allowed it to obtain nearly 50% of the votes in 1995, 2001 and 2014, and 45% in 2001. What
is the implied price of a vote? We compute it in Table 9 for each counterfactual scenario /
election. According to our estimates, the price of a vote for municipal elections is equal to
about 32 euros. Interestingly, this price is higher than for legislative elections. This could be
due to the fact that voters have better sources of information as to the candidates running for
more local elections. We discuss in Section 8 the channels through which campaign spending
may play a role: spending may decrease the cost of information for voters. If this cost is lower
for municipal than for legislative elections, then it may be more costly to mobilize voters for
the municipal ones.
[Table 9 about here.]
5.3 Depending on the Sources of Funding
Hence, spending by candidates has a positive e↵ect on their vote shares. Does this e↵ect vary
depending on the sources of funding? Determining whether this is the case is of particular
importance given that, as we have noted above, di↵erent candidates rely on di↵erent sources
of funding, and in particular di↵er regarding the importance of the private donations they
receive. In this Section, we estimate equation (3) but rather than considering spending as a
whole, study independently the e↵ect of personal contributions, private donations and party
contributions. (The in-kind contributions and the contributions from other sources – these
two categories taken together represent on average less than 5% of the total campaign revenue
both for legislative and for municipal elections – are also included as independent variables,
but we do not report the point estimates in the tables for the sake of space.)
Legislative elections Table 10 presents the results for the legislative elections.
[Table 10 about here.]
A number of findings can be highlighted. First, for all the political parties, we find
that personal contributions have a positive and statistically significant impact on their vote
shares. On the contrary, with the exception of the Green party and the right-wing party,
party contributions seem not to matter.
Regarding private donations, they have a positive and statistically significant e↵ect but
only for the right-wing party and the socialist party. Moreover, the magnitude of the e↵ect
is much more important for the right-wing party. This is of particular importance given that
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on average the right-wing candidates receive e18, 000 in private donations, i.e. more than
e8, 000 than the socialist party candidates, while candidates for the other three parties receive
nearly no donations. According to our estimates, an increase by one euro in the amount of
private donations received increases the log ratio of the vote shares for the right-wing party
by 0.42.
Municipal elections If we now turn to municipal elections, we find similarly that, for the
two main parties (left and right), party contributions only marginally matter. The results
are presented in Table 11. Private donations and personal contributions, on the contrary,
increase the vote shares of both the right and the left with respect to the other party. E.g., a
one-euro increase in private donations per voter of the right-wing party increases the log ratio
of the right-wing party share of the vote relative to the other party by 0.23. The magnitude
of the e↵ect is lower (but still statistically significant at the one-percent level) for personal
contributions, with a point estimate of 0.17.
[Table 11 about here.]
Counterfactual experiment: equalizing the amount of private donations What
would be the e↵ect of equalizing the amount of private donations to campaigns? Our empirical
setting allows us to perform such an estimation. We assume that, everything else being equal,
in each electoral district and for each municipal election, right-wing parties receive the same
amount of private donations per voter as left-wing parties. In a large majority of the cases,
this amounts to assuming a decrease in the amount of private donations received by the
right-wing party. As illustrated in the online Appendix Table C.2, in each of the municipal
elections, candidates from the right-wing party have indeed consistently received on average
more donations than those from the left-wing parties (e0.23 less per voter on average).
Table 12 presents the results of our estimation. If in each electoral district, the amount
of private donations received by the right-wing party candidates had been constrained to be
equal to the one received by the left-wing party candidates, it would have translated in a
decrease of around e3.4 millions in the total amount of private donations received by right-
wing candidates in 1995, e1.7 million in 2001, e2.3 million in 2008, and e4.6 million in
2014. What would have been the impact on the number of votes received by the right-wing
party candidates? In the 2014 elections, the right-wing party candidates would have received
259, 357 less votes (summed over all the electoral districts). In other words, the cost of a vote
in the 2014 municipal elections was of around e18 in private donations.
[Table 12 about here.]
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Mechanisms Why do private donations matter more than other sources of funding? First,
it may be due to a signaling e↵ect: for example citizens may choose to vote for the candidate
who they know is receiving more donations, because they anticipate she will win (a “band-
wagon e↵ect”34). (Citizens may also chose both to vote for a candidate, and to contribute
money to her campaign.)
Second, citizens may vote for the candidates who receive more private donations if these
candidates are also those that spend more because they are “impressed” by money. Money
can indeed buy influence over “impressionable” voters (Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman,
1996). For example the size of contributions may show a candidate’s ability as a fundraiser
(Potters et al., 1997) or a↵ect voters’ perceptions about the social benefits of a project (Helsley
and O’Sullivan, 1994).35 Private donations can also be seen as an e↵ective instrument to
provide voters with useful political information if donors are more likely to give money to high-
quality candidates. However, Snyder et al. (2010) show that large donations and donations
from individuals provide no informational benefit.
Moreover, private donations can benefit the candidate by deterring challengers. E.g. Ep-
stein and Zemsky (1995) develop a signaling model in which the incumbent employs strategic
fundraising to deter strong challengers from running. They show that by raising a lot of funds,
the incumbent tries to convince potential challengers that she is of “high” quality, and thus
very hard to beat in an election. However, they find that only in certain limited cases does
fundraising actually deter quality challengers from entering the race.
Third, the relative importance of private donations may come from the fact that they are
the main source of spending di↵erences between candidates in a given electoral district. There
are indeed more variations in private donations than in personal contributions. If candidates
are not willing (or able) to spend their own money, then they are limited by the reimbursement
threshold with respect to their personal contribution.
6 Results: Full Information Approach
In this Section, we follow the “full information approach” of Honaker et al. (2002). In other
words, we focus on the e↵ective rather than the actual vote and treat the problem of explaining
the vote in partially contested districts as a missing data problem. The steps of our empirical
analysis are described above (Section 4). We do it for the legislative elections, given that for
these elections we use party level data.
Table 13 presents the results. An observation is as before a district/election but our
34There is a large literature on bandwagon e↵ects, i.e. the fact that pools may lead to changes in preferences.
See e.g. Simon (1954); Fleitas (1971); Gartner (1976); Du↵y and Tavits (2008); Großer and Schram (2010).
However, in a recent study, Gerber et al. (2017) find no causal evidence of bandwagon e↵ects with respect to
actual voting.
35Lohmann (1993) develops a similar argument regarding the size of mass political action.
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sample now includes 2, 571 observations (given that the partially contested districts are now
part of the analysis). Reassuringly, the results we obtain are consistent with the ones in
Table 6. First, for all the five parties that are part of our analysis (Communist party, Green
party, Socialist party, right-wing party and extreme-right party), we obtain a positive and
statistically significant e↵ect of spending on their vote shares. Second, the magnitude of the
e↵ects is roughly the same, with point estimates varying between 1.08 and 3.93 depending on
the political parties. In particular, the magnitude of the estimates is nearly unchanged for
the smallest parties (e.g. the Communist party with a point estimate equal to 1.15 both in
Table 13 and in Table 6) which are the ones for which imputed votes in the highest number
of districts.
[Table 13 about here.]
Hence, the two approaches that have been proposed in the literature to tackle the issue
of not fully contested districts (estimating the e↵ects only in fully contested districts, and
studying e↵ective rather than actual votes) give consistent results, with a statistically and
economically significant impact of spending on the vote shares.
7 IV Estimation
Determining the causal impact of spending on votes is complicated by the endogenous nature
of campaign spending. The endogeneity can drive the results in a number of di↵erent direc-
tions. On the one hand, bias can come from the fact that it is di cult to measure the quality
of a candidate empirically. Yet high-quality candidates are likely to receive a higher share of
the votes and have high campaign expenditures. This may lead us to overestimate the e↵ect
of spending on votes. On the other hand, one may underestimate the e↵ect of spending if
candidates having a hard time spend large amounts to win36, whereas candidates with a high
probability of winning can spend less and still win.
We propose a new instrumental variable to deal with spending endogeneity. Our strategy
uses a change in legislation.37 In 1995, France enacted a law according to which it was no
longer allowed for a candidate to receive donations from legal entities. This law was applied
for the first time for the 1997 legislative elections. Interestingly for us, it did not a↵ect all the
candidates the same way: some candidates were relying strongly on private donations from
legal entities, while others were not, as illustrated in Table 14. While the average amount of
36This was for example the case of Nicolas Sarkozy in the 2012 presidential election.
37There is a large literature on contribution limits in the U.S.. E.g. Stratmann et al. (2006) investigate
whether campaign contribution restrictions have an e↵ect on candidates’ vote shares and find that they narrow
the margin of victory of the winning candidate; Primo and Milyo (2006) study the e↵ects of changes in campaign
finance laws on political e cacy, Hamm and Hogan (2008) on patterns of candidacy, and Barber (2016) on the
ideologies of legislators in o ce.
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private donations received from legal persons in 1993 is e8, 600, the median is e0. On average,
these donations represented 22.6% of the total private contributions (both from individuals
and legal entities), and 12.6% of the candidates’ total revenues.
[Table 14 about here.]
More precisely, among the 5, 116 candidates who ran for the 1993 legislative elections and
for which we have spending data38, 3, 431 (67%) received no private donations from legal
persons, while 1, 685 received at least some. Conditional on receiving at least some legal
persons’ private donations, the average amount received was equal to e0.39 per eligible voter,
and represented 67% of the total private donations received.
Online Appendix Table C.5 shows the extent to which the amount of private donations
received from legal entities varied depending on the political party. Not surprisingly given the
di↵erences in the overall importance of private donations previously highlighted, candidates
from the Socialist party and the right-wing party take the lion’s share with, respectively, in
1993 e4, 482 and e7, 750 in donations from legal entities.
We instrument the change in spending between the 1993 and the 1997 legislative elections
by the donations from legal entities received in 1993. Given that for our IV strategy to
be implemented we need the candidates to be present both in 1993 and 1997, our sample
of candidates here is limited to those 1, 496 candidates who ran in both elections. Among
them, 768 candidates (53%) received no donations from legal entities in 1993, while the others
received at least some. In the online Appendix Table C.6 we present summary statistics similar
to those in Table 14 but only for the candidates who run both in 1993 and in 1997 and that
we can use in our IV estimation. Those candidates received relatively more donations from
legal persons (e16, 011), and these donations represent around one third of the total private
donations they received.
Figure 5 illustrates that the candidates who rely strongly on donations from legal persons
– and that we observe both in 1993 and in 1997 – were not able to recover from the ban.
On average, an additional euro received from legal persons in 1993 is associated with a 0.46
decrease in total revenues between 1993 and 1997. As highlighted in the introduction, this
may be partly due to the fact the 1997 French legislative elections were unexpected (the next
elections were not due until May 1998 when the French President Jacques Chirac announced
in April 1997 the dissolution of the National Assembly).
[Figure 5 about here.]
In Table 15, we present the results of the estimation of the following equation:
38A total of 5, 333 candidates ran in 1993; we don’t have spending data for 4% of them.
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 spendingcjm = ↵+  donations legal entitiescjm +  j + ⇣m + ✏cjm (4)
where c indexes the candidates, j the political party andm as before the district.  spendingcjm(=
spendingcjm1997  spendingcjm1993) is the di↵erence between the amounts candidates who run
both in the 1993 and in the 1997 legislative elections spent in 1993 and in 1997.39  j and ⇣m
denote fixed e↵ects for political party and electoral district, respectively. An observation is a
candidate. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
[Table 15 about here.]
For each candidate, we obtain from the estimation of equation (4) the predicted value of
the change in spending between 1993 and 1997 (using the estimate in column (2), with party
fixed e↵ects). From this predicted value, we compute the predicted 1997 spending. We then
use this predicted value as our outcome of interest and estimate the following model:
vote share Socialist m1997 = ↵1 +
2X
j=1
 1j predicted spendingjm1997 +
2X
j=1
 1j Incumbentjm1997 +X
0
m19971
vote share Right m1997 = ↵2 +
2X
j=1
 2j predicted spendingjm1997 +
2X
j=1
 2j Incumbentjm1997 +X
0
m19972
(5)
Compared to the previously described equation (3), we focus here on the Socialist and the
right-wing party and include the candidates from the other parties in the “other” category.
The dependent variables of interest are thus the log ratio of the Socialist and of the right-wing
party share of the vote relative to that of the newly defined other category. We do so because,
given the constraint that we need the candidates to have run both in 1993 and in 1997, we only
have a few districts that are fully contested if we take all five parties into account. Moreover,
given that we are only focusing on the 1997 elections here, we cannot introduce district and
election fixed e↵ects as before. However, the vector X0m1997 contains the same district-level
controls as before.
Table 16 presents the results of the estimation (we use as before the Clarify suite to
estimate equation (5)). Note that we only have here results for one election (1997) and 116
districts (the districts where the same candidates both from the socialist and the right-wing
party ran in 1993 and in 1997). Hence it is not surprising that the point estimates are di↵erent
to the ones previously obtained. What is of interest here is to compare the naive estimates
39Note that no district-level controls are included here given that we only have one year (1997) and control
for district fixed e↵ects.
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(using the actual spending) and the estimates we obtain when focusing on the predicted value
of spending.
Using both the actual and the predicted value of spending, we obtain that spending by
the Socialist party has a positive and statistically significant e↵ect on the vote shares of the
party. Moreover, once we instrument for spending, we find that the socialist party spending
also has a negative e↵ect on the vote shares obtained by the right-wing party. Taking into
account both e↵ects, we conclude that the IV e↵ects are only slightly smaller than the OLS
estimates, suggesting that our findings are not driven by the endogeneity of spending.
[Table 16 about here.]
Party-level estimation The main issue with Table 16 is that, given we need the same
candidates both from the socialist and the right-wing party to run in 1993 and in 1997, we
only have information for 118 districts. This may explain why, even when considering the
actual spending of the right-wing party, we find no statistically significant e↵ect of spending
on votes (contrarily to previous results).
We also applied the same IV methodology to the set of all electoral districts where both
the socialist party and the right-wing party have candidates in 1993 and 1997 (even if the
identity of the candidates change). In e↵ect, this is assuming that private donations by
legal entities are made to parties rather than to specific candidates, at least in part. In the
online Appendix Figure D.10, we plot as before the correlation between the amount of private
donations received from legal entities in 1993 and the change in total revenues between 1993
and 1997, but an observation is now a political party rather than a candidate. This correlation
is negative and nearly as strong as the one where we focus on candidates running twice: an
additional euro from legal entities is associated with a e0.33 decrease in total spending.
The results of the SUR estimations are reported in Table 17. When considering these
463 districts, we find that the IV point estimates are only slightly lower than the OLS esti-
mates, both for the right-wing party and the socialist party. Moreover, they are statistically
significant at the one-percent level.
[Table 17 about here.]
8 Additional Results and Discussion
Turnout In this paper, we show that spending at elections has a positive e↵ect on the vote
shares of the spending party. According to our estimates, the price of a vote in legislative
elections is of around 6 euros, while it is equal to 32 euros for the municipal ones. Why
is this the case? Herrera et al. (2008) identify di↵erent roles of campaign spending. First,
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spending can move party sympathizers to e↵ectively vote, what they call the “mobilization
e↵ect” of campaign spending. Second, spending can help persuade undecided voters or voters
leaning to the other party of the merits of one party’s policies by providing information (see
e.g. Baron, 1994; Coate, 2004; Prat, 2002a,b; Schultz, 2007). This is the “persuasion e↵ect”
of spending. Finally, campaign spending can be used to dissuade sympathizers of the other
party from voting.
To estimate the extent to which spending has a mobilization e↵ect, we investigate the im-
pact of spending on turnout at legislative and municipal elections. Our empirical specification
is the following:
turnoutmt = ↵ +   total spendingmt +  competitivenessmt + X
0
mt +  m + ⌘t + ✏mt (6)
where as before t indexes the election (1995, 2001, 2008, and 2014 for municipal elections;
1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 for legislative elections) and m the district. The outcome
of interest, turnoutmt, is the turnout in the first round of the election. total spendingmt
is the total amount spent by candidates (per registered voter) in district m and election t.
We consider alternately this aggregated variable and the spending of the di↵erent political
parties taken individually. The vector Xmt contains the same municipality-level controls
as before (demographic controls and incumbency dummies). We also control here for the
competitiveness of the election (competitivenessmt), i.e. the number of candidates running.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Table 18 presents the results for the legislative elections. A one-euro increase in total
spending by registered voters increases turnout by 0.25 percentage points. This e↵ect is
mainly driven by spending by the Green party, the Socialist party and the right-wing party.
Spending by other parties seems not to a↵ect turnout. In the online Appendix Table C.7 we
report the standardized coe cients (Beta coe cients). A one-standard deviation increase in
spending by the Green party increases turnout by 6 percent of a standard deviation. The
magnitude of the e↵ect is of 4 percent of a standard deviation for the socialist and the right-
wing party.
[Table 18 about here.]
Table 19 presents the results for the municipal elections. We find a positive and statistically
significant e↵ect of spending on turnout. This e↵ect is driven by all the parties to the exception
of the extreme left. In terms of magnitude, the mobilization e↵ect of spending is more
important for municipal than for legislative elections. A one-standard deviation increase in
total spending by candidates increases turnout by 25 percent of a standard deviation (online
Appendix Table C.8 reports the beta coe cients).
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Such a positive e↵ect of spending on turnout can be rationalized by the fact that spending
decreases the cost of information for voters. It is consistent with previous findings in the
literature, in particular regarding the positive impact of door-to-door canvassing on voter
turnout (see e.g. Gerber and Green, 2000) and on voter registration (Braconnier et al., 2017).
Note however that this large e↵ect may be partly driven by the fact that parties may decide
to spend more in districts where they anticipate a high participation.
[Table 19 about here.]
Donations from legal persons The IV strategy we present in Section 7 relies on the 1995
legal person donations ban. The assumption we implicitly make here is that this ban was
actually obeyed and that firms stopped contributing to campaigns. Obviously, it may be that
at least a number of these firms found di↵erent ways to contribute after the ban, e.g. through
unreported in-kind contributions or by encouraging their employees to contribute. We do not
deny this possibility and indeed such hidden contributions may have happened to a certain
extent. For example in the U.S. context, Tahoun and Vasvari (2016) document an interesting
direct channel through which firms influence the political process, namely the amount and
terms of the personal debt taken on by politicians and their close family members.40
However, the fact that we show that a number of candidates were not able to recover
from this ban – with a decrease both in the total amount of campaign contributions they
received and in their probability of being elected – shows that at least an important share
of the existing donations by legal persons disappeared after the ban. We do not claim in
this article to be able to capture all the di↵erent forms money can take in politics, and we
are well-aware of all the limitations attached to the use of o cial records. It is nonetheless
important to highlight that despite all these limitations we do find in this paper that campaign
contributions influence votes.
Spatial and temporal correlation Using spatial and time data requires paying careful
attention to the possible correlations between observations that give rise to heteroscedasticity,
which can bias the estimates of standard error coe cients. Electoral data, by their nature, are
subject to such pitfalls since electoral districts are geographically defined, as demonstrated
by Ferguson et al. (2016). If serial correlation is well known and often corrected for, it is
not the case for spatial correlation, which creates the same type of bias. Nearby units are
dependent and this within-cluster error can lead to erroneously low standard errors. It is
therefore necessary to correct standard errors for spatial and temporal correlation. We do
that following Conley (1999), Hsiang (2010) and Fetzer (2014). The program estimates the
40On the benefits flowing from firms to politicians, see also Bertrand et al. (2008). Ferguson et al. (2017)
illustrate the di↵erent “shades” money can take in U.S. politics.
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model (OLS) a first time to recover the variance-covariance matrix of residuals. The next
step consists in including this matrix to recompute the standard errors of the estimates.
In our main specification, we use Seemingly Unrelated Regressions to take into account
the multiparty nature of our data. SUR regression accounts for the interdependence of the
multiple equation by correcting the variance-covariance matrix. Correcting for those two
dimensions is a di cult process. We may need to make additional assumptions on this matrix
(and possibly define the joint hypothesis associated with these two dimensions we want to
account for). A more cautious way to proceed would be to correct for the spatial and time
correlation on every equation separately. The underlying assumption is the following: if
the correction for time and space correlation does not change the estimates in the single
regression taken independently, there is no reason to expect that spatial and time correlation
will bias the estimates of the SUR model. Like so, we present the di↵erences in the two
models (non-corrected vs corrected for time and spatial correlation) for every party estimated
independently. We use di↵erent values of the parameters of Conley’s spatial correction.
The ranges chosen for spatial correction for legislative elections are respectively 50km,
100km and 200km in Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3, respectively, in the online Appendix. The lag
for over-time correlation is set to 1 time period (6 years for municipal elections and 5 years
for legislative)41. For every party but PC and PS, the results are robust to correction for
space and time correlation, in the sense that we do not observe change in the significance
levels of coe cients for these parties. Interestingly, the coe cient is more significant for left-
wing parties when we apply this correction. Results for municipal elections are presented
in Tables E.4, E.5 and E.6. Once again, the results are robust to correction for space and
time correlation. If anything, the results become even more significant when time and space
correlation are taken into account.
9 Conclusion
What role does money play in direct democracy? In this paper we have investigated the
impact of campaign spending on votes in local (municipal and legislative) elections in France
over three decades. We exploit changes in legislation to estimate the causal e↵ect of spending
on votes, and use recent methodological innovations to handle the special characteristics of
multiparty data. We find that, despite strict limitation in campaign spending and contribu-
tions, money still plays an important role in French politics. In particular, we highlight the
particular role played by private donations. The results we obtain question the relevance of
existing legislation to control and limit the amount private individuals can give to candidates.
If it is relative cheap to buy a vote (around e6 for municipal elections and e32 for the leg-
41Results are available upon request for higher lags and do not change the conclusions
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islative ones according to our estimates), then it means that the current level of contribution
limits may be too high. Obviously, determining the optimal level of contribution limits is
beyond the scope of this paper.
We hope nonetheless that these results will benefit the public debate. While it seems that
political power is increasingly conditioned upon wealth (see e.g. Ferguson, 1995; Ferguson
et al., 2013), lessons can be drawn from France to improve legislation in other countries, e.g.
in the United Kingdom where, like in France, campaign spending by candidates is subjected
to strong limitations.42 We leave this to future research.
42This is not to say that there is no di↵erence between the French and the British cases. In the U.K. for
example, while spending is limited, donations are not.
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(a) Change in spending limits’ rules
(b) Today’s rules
Notes: The figures plot the spending limit depending on the electoral districts’ population. In the upper figure 1a, we
illustrate the decrease in the spending limit introduced by the law of 1995. Bottom figure 1b plots today’s rules as they
apply for municipal and legislative elections. Campaign finance legislations are described in details in the text and in
the online Appendix.
Figure 1: Spending limits
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Notes: The figure plots the relationship between the proportions of total spending and total (first round) votes received
by candidate by district. The upper figure 2a shows this relationship for the legislative elections. The bottom figure 2b
shows this relationship for the municipal elections.
Figure 2: Relationship between the proportions of total spending and total votes
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2012 legislative elections: 1st round
(e) 2012
Notes: The figure shows how the share of the votes obtained by the di↵erent parties at the national level would have
changed (compared to the model) in each of the five legislative elections if the candidates running for the right-wing
party in all the electoral districts / years would have spent e0. The change in the number of votes received by each
party in each electoral district / year is obtained by using the Clarify statistical suite: (i) first, we estimate equation
(3) (the results are similar to the ones presented in Table 6); (ii) second, the program draws 1,000 simulations of the
main and ancillary parameters from their asymptotic sampling distribution; (iii) finally, we set the value of the
right-wing party spending per voter equal to 0 in all the electoral districts / elections, and use the simqi command to
simulate the votes obtained by the di↵erent parties in each electoral districts / elections in this case (we set the number
of simulations to be used when calculating expected values to 1, 000; all the other explanatory variables are set to their
real value). We then sum up for each elections all the votes at the national level to obtain the vote shares of the parties.
Figure 3: Legislative elections, Fully contested districts: Counterfactual estimation: no cam-
paign spending in all the electoral districts / years by the candidates running for the right-wing
party
41
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Vo
te
 sh
ar
es
 (%
)
Lef
t
Rig
h
Oth
er
Model
Counterfactual 1: No spending for right-wing
Counterfactual 2: right-wing spending = max (€4 per eligible voter)
1995 municipal elections: 1st round
(a) 1995
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Vo
te
 sh
ar
es
 (%
)
Lef
t
Rig
h
Oth
er
Model
Counterfactual 1: No spending for right-wing
Counterfactual 2: right-wing spending = max (€4 per eligible voter)
2001 municipal elections: 1st round
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2008 municipal elections: 1st round
(c) 2008
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2014 municipal elections: 1st round
(d) 2014
Notes: The figure shows how the share of the votes obtained by the di↵erent parties at the national level would have
changed (compared to the model) in each of the four municipal elections if the candidates running for the right-wing
party in all the electoral districts / years (i) had spent e0 (first conterfactual) or (ii) had spent e4 per eligible voter
(second conterfactual). For both counterfactuals, the change in the number of votes received by each party in each
electoral district / year is obtained by using the Clarify statistical suite: (i) first, we estimate equation (3) (the results
are similar to the ones presented in Table 8); (ii) second, the program draws 1,000 simulations of the main and ancillary
parameters from their asymptotic sampling distribution; (iii) finally, for the first counterfactual, we set the value of the
right-wing party spending per voter equal to 0 in all the electoral districts / elections, and use the simqi command to
simulate the votes obtained by the di↵erent parties in each electoral districts / elections in this case (we set the number of
simulations to be used when calculating expected values to 1, 000; all the other explanatory variables are set to their real
value). For the second counterfactual, we perform a similar analysis but set the value of the right-wing party spending
per voter equal to e4 in all the electoral districts / elections. We then sum up for each elections all the votes at the
national level to obtain the vote shares of the parties.
Figure 4: Municipal elections, Fully contested districts: Counterfactual estimations
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Figure 5: Change in total revenues between 1993 and 1997 depending on the donations from
legal entities received in 1993
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Number of candidates running in the first round
Number of candidates 1st round
Mean Median sd Min Max N
Municipal elections
1995 4.3 4.0 1.7 1 10 945
2001 3.8 3.0 1.8 1 11 933
2008 4.1 3.0 2.6 1 22 1,002
2014 4.2 4.0 1.8 1 15 1,052
Legislative elections
1993 9.6 9.0 2.6 5 22 555
1997 11.5 11.0 3.8 4 30 555
2002 15.7 15.0 3.9 7 37 555
2007 14.6 14.0 3.1 8 32 555
2012 12.0 11.0 3.3 7 26 540
Notes: The table presents summary statistics on the number of candidates running in the first ballot of municipal and
legislative elections. The observations are at the electoral district level. The drop in the number of electoral districts
between the 2007 and the 2012 legislative elections (from 555 to 540) comes from the 2010 redistricting of electoral
boundaries. While the total number of legislative constituencies was unchanged (577), 4 new constituencies were created
within oversea French territories, as well as 11 constituencies for French residents overseas. Hence the total number of
metropolitan France constituencies was decreased to 540.
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Table 2: Summary statistics: campaign spending
(a) Municipal elections
Spending (cst 2014 e)
Mean Median sd Min Max N
Total spending per candidate
1995 23,389 14,235 31,151 0 426,652 3,839
2001 25,335 14,922 35,409 0 477,550 3,485
2008 21,768 13,346 29,909 0 393,380 3,742
2014 21,177 13,094 28,694 0 458,914 4,435
Per candidate & per voter
1995 1.24 1.14 0.89 0.00 4.80 3,784
2001 1.32 1.27 1.06 0.00 22.76 3,082
2008 1.11 1.10 0.75 0.00 3.92 3,742
2014 1.05 1.01 0.71 0.00 3.98 4,435
Total spending per voter
1995 4.95 4.66 2.47 0.00 14.99 945
2001 4.37 4.23 3.26 0.00 52.62 933
2008 4.14 3.87 1.88 0.43 13.31 1,002
2014 4.43 4.18 1.86 0.44 12.31 1,052
(b) Legislative elections
Spending (cst 2014 e)
Mean Median sd Min Max N
Total spending per candidate
1993 21,637 11,143 26,916 0 170,564 5,116
1997 15,113 2,186 19,400 0 75,226 6,040
2002 11,261 1,414 17,148 0 81,169 7,981
2007 11,323 654 17,063 0 76,281 7,190
2012 18,282 17,320 17,164 0 71,351 3,942
Per candidate & per voter
1993 0.33 0.16 0.42 0.00 4.08 5,116
1997 0.23 0.03 0.30 0.00 1.87 6,040
2002 0.17 0.02 0.26 0.00 1.58 7,981
2007 0.15 0.01 0.24 0.00 1.50 7,190
2012 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.00 1.29 3,942
Total spending per voter
1993 3.01 2.84 1.20 0.49 9.10 555
1997 2.48 2.36 0.74 0.00 6.24 555
2002 2.38 2.15 0.91 0.81 7.40 555
2007 2.00 1.87 0.66 0.63 5.34 555
2012 1.70 1.63 0.52 0.00 4.51 540
Notes: The table presents summary statistics on spending by candidates running in municipal and legislative elections.
For the “total spending per candidate” and the total spending “per candidate & per voter” variables, an observation is
a candidate/election. For the “total spending per voter” variable, an observation is an electoral district / election. The
upper Table 2a shows the results for the municipal elections, and the bottom Table 2b for the legislative elections.
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Table 3: Summary statistics: campaign revenue per sources of funding
(a) Municipal elections
Mean Median sd Min Max Obs
Private donations (%) 15.9 5.8 22.5 0 100 15,123
Party contributions (%) 7.3 0.0 19.9 0 100 15,124
Personal contributions (%) 73.9 84.6 29.2 0 100 15,121
In-kind contributions (%) 2.5 0.0 7.6 0 100 15,219
Other (%) 0.3 0.0 2.5 0 94 15,219
(b) Legislative elections
Mean Median sd Min Max Obs
Private donations (%) 15.4 0.0 26.9 0 100 24,738
Party contributions (%) 28.2 5.2 37.4 0 100 24,765
Personal contributions (%) 50.9 56.9 41.5 0 100 24,730
In-kind contributions (%) 4.5 0.0 14.6 0 100 24,820
Other (%) 0.8 0.0 4.9 0 100 24,820
Notes: The table presents summary statistics on candidates’ campaign revenue depending on the sources of funding.
An observation is a candidate/election. The upper Table 3a presents the statistics for the municipal elections, and the
bottom Table 3b for the legislative elections.
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Table 6: Spending and first round vote share: SUR estimates, Legislative elections (1993-
2012), Fully contested districts
Log ratios of vote shares with respect to other party
Communist Green Socialist Right-wing Extreme-right
Communist spending 1.15⇤⇤⇤ -0.09 -0.43⇤⇤⇤ -0.34⇤ -0.09
(0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.20) (0.14)
Communist spending-squared -0.45⇤⇤⇤ 0.14 0.18 0.31⇤⇤ 0.17
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11)
Green spending 0.56⇤ 2.91⇤⇤⇤ -0.05 0.01 0.15
(0.28) (0.31) (0.28) (0.35) (0.25)
Green spending-squared -0.28 -1.57⇤⇤⇤ 0.43 0.38 0.32
(0.45) (0.49) (0.44) (0.55) (0.39)
Socialist spending -0.25⇤ -0.17 0.60⇤⇤⇤ -0.63⇤⇤⇤ -0.22⇤
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12)
Socialist spending-squared 0.13⇤ -0.04 -0.12 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.11⇤
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
Right-wing spending 0.52⇤⇤⇤ 0.58⇤⇤⇤ 0.53⇤⇤⇤ 2.09⇤⇤⇤ 0.33⇤⇤⇤
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11)
Right-wing spending-squared -0.24⇤⇤⇤ -0.33⇤⇤⇤ -0.22⇤⇤⇤ -0.77⇤⇤⇤ -0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Extreme-right spending 0.63⇤⇤ 0.22 0.39 0.64⇤ 0.55⇤⇤
(0.27) (0.30) (0.26) (0.33) (0.23)
Extreme-right spending-squared -0.95⇤⇤ -0.12 -0.36 -0.78⇤ -0.25
(0.37) (0.41) (0.37) (0.46) (0.32)
Other spending -1.66⇤⇤⇤ -1.73⇤⇤⇤ -1.67⇤⇤⇤ -2.15⇤⇤⇤ -1.64⇤⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Other spending-squared 0.37⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.34⇤⇤⇤ 0.41⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Controls
Communist party Incumbent 0.35⇤⇤⇤ -0.18 -0.32⇤⇤⇤ -0.09 -0.07
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.10)
Socialist party Incumbent 0.03 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
Right-wing party Incumbent 0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
% 15-19 years old -0.18⇤ -0.05 -0.16⇤ 0.06 -0.16⇤
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08)
% 20-24 years old -0.00 -0.17⇤ -0.00 -0.09 -0.08
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08)
% 65 of older 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.05⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
% no diploma 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
% higher education 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.02 0.01 -0.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
% blue collar workers -0.06⇤⇤⇤ -0.04⇤ -0.03 -0.09⇤⇤⇤ -0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Unemployment rate 0.02 -0.05⇤ 0.02 0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Election and District FE Yes
Observations 1,477
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The model is estimated using SUR estimates. An observation is a dis-
trict/election. The estimation includes electoral district and election fixed e↵ects. Variables are described in more
details in the text.
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Table 8: Spending and first round vote share: SUR estimates, Municipal elections (1995-2014),
Fully contested districts
Log ratios of vote shares with respect to other party
Left Right
Left spending 0.31⇤⇤⇤ -0.01
(0.03) (0.04)
Left spending-squared -0.02⇤⇤⇤ -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Right spending 0.07⇤⇤ 0.32⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.03)
Right spending-squared -0.00 -0.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.00)
Other candidates’ spending -0.83⇤⇤⇤ -0.87⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.04)
Other spending-squared 0.09⇤⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01)
Controls
Left Incumbent -0.06 -0.08
(0.05) (0.05)
Right Incumbent -0.07 0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
% 15-19 years old 0.01 0.06
(0.03) (0.04)
% 20-24 years old 0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
% 65 of older -0.06⇤⇤⇤ -0.04⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01)
% no diploma 0.08⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01)
% higher education 0.02⇤⇤ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
% blue collar workers -0.02⇤⇤⇤ -0.02⇤
(0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment rate -0.02⇤⇤ -0.03⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01)
Election FE Yes
District FE Yes
Observations 1,776
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The model is estimated using SUR estimates. An observation is a dis-
trict/election. The estimation includes electoral district and election fixed e↵ects. Variables are described in more
details in the text.
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Table 11: Spending and first round vote share depending on the sources of funding: SUR
estimates, Municipal elections, Fully contested districts
Log ratios of vote shares with respect to other party
Left Right
Left
Private donations 0.25⇤⇤⇤ 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Party contribution 0.04 -0.11⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.05)
Personal contribution 0.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Right
Private donations 0.01 0.23⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.03)
Party contribution -0.01 0.07⇤
(0.04) (0.04)
Personal contribution 0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.17⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01)
Other
Private donations -0.66⇤⇤⇤ -0.79⇤⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.08)
Party contribution -0.41⇤⇤⇤ -0.47⇤⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.09)
Personal contribution -0.48⇤⇤⇤ -0.54⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02)
Election and District FE Yes
Controls Yes
Observations 1,776
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The model is estimated using SUR estimates. An observation is a dis-
trict/election. The estimation includes electoral district and election fixed e↵ects, as well as the same controls than in
Table 8 (coe cients for the controls are not reported for the sake of space). Variables are described in more detail in
the text.
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Table 12: Impact of private donations on votes for right-wing party: Municipal elections,
counterfactual estimate: right-wing private donations in all the districts / years are equal to
the actual amount of the left-wing private donations received in these districts / years
Model Right private donations = left private donations
Year Votes Votes Change in votes Change in private donations “Private donations”
price of a vote
1995 5,570,893 5,385,728 -185,165 -e3,475,324 e18.8
2001 4,384,949 4,280,149 -104,799 -e1,748,970 e16.7
2008 4,754,836 4,627,429 -127,407 -e2,347,980 e18.4
2014 6,207,885 5,948,527 -259,357 -e4,647,410 e17.9
Notes: The table presents the results of the following counterfactual experiment for the municipal elections: the amount
of private donations received by all the right-wing party candidates in all the electoral districts / years are equalized to
the actual amount of private donations received by the left-wing party candidates in these districts / years. The change
in the number of votes received by the right-wing party is obtained by using the Clarify statistical suite: (i) first, we
estimate equation (3) with spending by sources of funding as independent variables (the results are similar to the ones
presented in Table 11); (ii) second, the program draws 1,000 simulations of the main and ancillary parameters from their
asymptotic sampling distribution; (iii) finally, we set the value of the private donations received by the right-wing party
candidates equal to the value of the private donations received by the left-wing party candidates in all the electoral
districts / elections, and use the simqi command to simulate the votes obtained by the di↵erent parties in each electoral
districts / elections in this case (we set the number of simulations to be used when calculating expected values to 1, 000;
all the other explanatory variables are set to their real value).
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Table 14: Summary statistics: Donations from legal entities
Legislative elections (1993)
Mean Median P95 P99 Max Obs
Donations from legal entities 8,560 0 58,375 102,861 350,355 5,116
Per registered voter 0.13 0.00 0.84 1.59 6.67 5,116
As a % of total revenues 12.4 0.0 70.5 91.0 100 5,116
As a % of total private entities 22.4 0.0 96.5 100 100 5,116
Notes: The table gives summary statistics. Year is 1993. Variables are values for the candidates running in
the legislative election. The observations are at the candidate level.
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Table 15: Donations from legal entities and change in spending
Change in total spending (1993-1997)
Donations from legal entities -0.47⇤⇤⇤ -0.35⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.05)
District FE Yes Yes
Party FE No Yes
R-sq 0.59 0.74
Observations 1,415 1,415
Cluster (district) 541 541
Mean DepVar -0.08 -0.08
Sd DepVar 0.33 0.33
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The models are estimated using OLS. An observation is a candidate. The
estimations include district fixed e↵ects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Variables are described in
more detail in the text.
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Table 18: Spending and first round turnout: Legislative elections
Turnout Turnout Turnout
Total spending 0.24⇤⇤⇤
(0.08)
Communist party spending -0.46 -0.46
(0.36) (0.35)
Green party spending 2.16⇤⇤⇤ 2.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.50) (0.49)
Socialist party spending 0.66⇤⇤⇤ 0.71⇤⇤⇤
(0.22) (0.22)
Right-wing party spending 0.50⇤⇤ 0.51⇤⇤
(0.20) (0.20)
Extreme-right spending -0.14 -0.06
(0.39) (0.39)
Spending by other candidates 0.01 0.13
(0.12) (0.12)
Number of candidates -0.10⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
Election FE Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-sq 0.88 0.88 0.88
Observations 2,758 2,758 2,758
Clusters (districts) 572 572 572
Mean DepVar 62.4 62.4 62.4
Sd DepVar 4.9 4.9 4.9
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The models are estimated using OLS. An observation is an electoral district /
year. All the estimations include electoral district fixed e↵ects and election fixed e↵ects as well as district-level controls.
The controls are the same as in Table 6 (coe cients for the controls are not reported for the sake of space). Standard
errors are clustered at the district level. Variables are described in more detail in the text.
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Table 19: Spending and first round turnout: Municipal elections
Turnout Turnout Turnout
Total spending 0.85⇤⇤⇤
(0.06)
Extreme-left spending 0.47 0.38
(0.82) (0.80)
Left spending 1.00⇤⇤⇤ 0.97⇤⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.10)
Right spending 0.71⇤⇤⇤ 0.68⇤⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.08)
Extreme-right spending 0.85⇤⇤⇤ 0.80⇤⇤⇤
(0.17) (0.18)
Spending by other candidates 1.06⇤⇤⇤ 1.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.13) (0.12)
Number of candidates 0.11⇤⇤
(0.05)
Election FE Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-sq 0.83 0.83 0.83
Observations 3,743 3,743 3,743
Clusters (districts) 1,078 1,078 1,078
Mean DepVar 57.9 57.9 57.9
Sd DepVar 6.6 6.6 6.6
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The models are estimated using OLS. An observation is an electoral district /
year. All the estimations include electoral district fixed e↵ects and election fixed e↵ects as well as district-level controls.
The controls are the same controls than in Table 8 (coe cients for the controls are not reported for the sake of space).
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Variables are described in more detail in the text.
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